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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
As our country struggles with returning to normalcy 
after the difficulties inflicted by the novel coronavirus, COVID-
19, lawsuits are beginning to originate throughout the fifty 
states, at least in part, from repercussions associated with the 
outbreak. With companies just starting to reopen their doors, 
some experts believe that tort lawyers are readying clients to 
file lawsuits claiming lost wages and medical costs associated 
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Florida in the College of Community Innovation and Education. In 
the legal studies department, he has taught a variety of classes 
including trial advocacy and advanced trial advocacy as well as 
assisted with both the school’s moot court program and mock trial 
team. He earned his J.D. with Honors from the University of Florida 
College of Law and his LL.M. with distinction from Stetson Law 
School in trial advocacy. 
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with contracting the disease while in a person’s employment.2 
The possibility of wrongful death lawsuits initiating from the 
cruise ship industry is a valid concern as well. Indeed, an April 
23, 2020, Miami Herald article reported at least seventy-six 
deaths related to the industry.3 The list of potential cases is 
endless. There are nursing home industry fatalities; 
employment issues for back pay; commercial real estate leases 
broken by once-profitable companies; and criminal charges for 
breaking stay-at-home orders. The list goes on and on. 
Ultimately, should these cases be brought to trial, jurors 
will decide their fate.  But, as with any proceeding, the parties’ 
ability to obtain a fair trial is paramount. Many mechanisms 
have been put in place to guarantee this protection. One in 
particular is the use of change of venue requests. Lawyers who 
believe that it is impossible to select a fair jury from a particular 
location may seek this unusual remedy hoping to have their 
case transferred to a different locale to ensure fairness and 
impartiality. Typically, these requests are made in high profile 
cases when an overabundance of media attention has tainted 
the jury pool. But other examples also exist. Changes of venue 
have occurred either because a party employed several 
individuals in a town, or a community was significantly 
impacted by a defendant’s misdeeds. 
This article attempts to determine the validity of change 
of venue requests for COVID-19 related cases in “hot spots” 
where the disease has been extremely prevalent or deadly. The 
hypothesis is that these locations will have a greater potential 
for jurors to be tainted because it will be unlikely that enough 
potential jurors will be affected from the repercussions of the 
disease. It will begin by tracing the history of change of venue 
motions to determine the rationale behind their use. Next, 
examples will be provided of successful and unsuccessful 
change of venue requests to determine how the courts will 
decide when the remedy is appropriate versus when it is not. 
 
2 Amanda Bronstad, As Businesses Reopen, Lawsuits Loom Over 
COVID-19-19 Exposure, LAW.COM (May 1, 2020, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.law.com/2020/05/01/as-businesses-reopen-lawsuits-
loom-over-covid-19-exposure/. 
3 Sarah Blaskey, et al., COVID-19 Cruises, How Many Coronavirus Cases 
Have Been Linked to Cruises? Check Out the Latest Numbers, MIAMI 
HERALD (April 23, 2020, 12:01 PM, UPDATED May 15, 2020, 02:31 
PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/tourism-
cruises/article241914096.html. 
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Based on this analysis, the article will then attempt to predict 
the general likelihood that these requests will be successful in 
COVID-19 related cases. 
The document’s ultimate goal is to provide guidance on 
if and how these challenges should be made. As of the writing 
of this article, the United States is approaching nearly five 
million confirmed cases of the disease.4 It is predicted that by 
December, 2020, our country will see three hundred thousand 
Americans lose their lives because of the illness.5 At its peak, 
the unemployment rate hit 14.7%--numbers not seen since the 
Great Depression.6 There is no doubt that COVID-19 has 
infiltrated every part of society. Most courts have been closed 
for months, and as such, they have halted the filing of new 
claims. But the keys to the courthouse cannot be withheld 
forever. It is only a matter of time before the flood gates open. 
 
II.  HISTORY BEHIND CHANGE OF VENUE   
 
The right to a fair and impartial jury in a specific venue 
is fundamental to our country’s jurisprudence. The protection 
is guaranteed to every litigant by the Federal Constitution. For 
instance, the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution states, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed . . . .”7 The privilege is extended to certain civil cases 
by the Seventh Amendment.8 And while an argument can be 
made that these rights have been extended to state proceedings 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, many states have taken it 
 
4 CDC COVID-19 DATA TRACKER, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-
updates/cases-in-us.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2020). 
5  Cecilia Smith-Schoenwalder, Key Model Predicts Nearly 300,000 
Coronavirus Deaths by December, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORTS 
(Aug. 6, 2020, 3:27 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/health-
news/articles/2020-08-06/key-model-predicts-nearly-300-000-
coronavirus-deaths-by-december. 
6 THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION—AUGUST 2020, 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 6, 2020).  
7 U.S.CONST. amend. VI. 
8 U.S.CONST. amend. VII. 
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upon themselves to assert similar guarantees in their state 
constitutions.9 
In Florida, for instance, the right to a specific venue and 
an impartial jury in criminal cases can be found in Article I 
Section 16.10 The text of the document states that all criminal 
defendants will be tried by a fair jury,  
 
. . . in the county where the crime was 
committed. If the county is not known, the 
indictment or information may charge venue in 
two or more counties conjunctively and proof 
that the crime was committed in that area shall 
be sufficient; but before pleading the accused 
may elect in which of those counties the trial will 
take place. Venue for prosecution of crimes 
committed beyond the boundaries of the state 
shall be fixed by law.11 
 
Section 22 of the Florida Constitution also grants this 
same right to litigants in civil cases.12 However, Florida is not 
alone in extending this privilege to its citizens. In Maine, the 
state constitution employs the word “vicinity” in defining 
where an impartial jury should be selected from.13 Other states 
such as Montana and Minnesota utilize the word “district” in 
characterizing venue.14 And, in West Virginia, the term 
“vicinage” is applied.15 
Some states go to great pains to recognize the 
relationship between venue and a fair jury.16 The Alabama 
Constitution, for example, explicitly safeguards the connection 
between the two concepts.17 Specifically, the section regarding 
due process in the state constitution reads: 
 
[T]he legislature may, by a general law, provide 
for a change of venue at the instance of the 
 
9 U.S.CONST. amend. XIV. 
10 FLA. CONST. art I. §. 16. 
11 Id. 
12 FLA. CONST. art I. § 22. 
13 ME. CONST. art I. § 6. 
14 MONT. CONST. art. II. § 24; MINN. CONST. art. I.§ 6. 
15 W.VA. CONST. art 1. § 8. 
16 ALA. CONST. art. I. § 6. 
17 Id. 
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defendant in all prosecutions by indictment, and 
such change of venue, on application of the 
defendant, may be heard and determined 
without the personal presence of the defendant 
so applying therefor; provided, that at the time 
of the application for the change of venue . . . .18   
 
The Arkansas Constitution also acknowledges the 
interplay between the two concepts by specifically mentioning 
a defendant’s right to change venue to receive a fair trial in 
Article II.19 
One of the earliest notations regarding the importance 
of venue and a fair jury can be found in England from 1856 
when their Parliament passed a law known as the Central 
Criminal Court Act.20 This was later called the Palmer Act after 
the notorious defendant in the case, Dr. William Palmer.21 In 
1855, Dr. Palmer, also known as the “Prince of Poisoners,” was 
tried for the murder of his friend, John Cook.22 Allegations 
against the doctor focused on the victim being poisoned by 
strychnine.23 
Before the trial occurred, Palmer raised a concern that 
he could not be tried by an impartial jury in the town of 
Staffordshire, where the murder had occurred.24 The case had 
received a high degree of notoriety in the press and 
newspapers.25 At one point, it was reported that Palmer’s wife 
and four children had previously died under mysterious 
circumstances from poisoning.26 In response to his concern, the 
English Parliament passed a law that allowed any crime 
committed outside of London to be tried at the Old Bailey 
 
18 Id. 
19 ARK. CONST. art. II § 10. 
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Courthouse,27 which had served as London’s central criminal 
courthouse since 1674.28 
Ultimately, Palmer was convicted and then later 
executed.29 But the infamy of the proceeding drew attention 
from the United States.30 Initially, the British decision was met 
with trepidation.31 The phrase “wherein the crime shall have 
been committed,” found in the Sixth Amendment, was a direct 
response to a worry that a powerful central government would 
unfairly try people away from their homes.32 Yet, as time 
progressed, Americans began to see the value of the Palmer Act 
in ensuring fundamental fairness.33 
One of the earliest United States Supreme Court cases 
mentioning the concept of change of venue was the case of Cook 
v. Burley, 78 U.S. 659 (1867).34 While the case itself does not 
center on the issue of change of venue, comments made by the 
trial judge regarding the defendant’s concern over an inability 
to obtain a fair and impartial trial can be found in dicta.35 The 
case involved a land deal in Texas between two parties.36 Both 
litigants alleged title to the same plot of land, which was 
approximately three-hundred acres in size.37 
Shortly before trial, the defendant requested a change of 
venue as he felt that he could not receive a fair trial in the 
current locale.38 In part, his concern was based on comments 
that the trial judge had made in a publication about the 
defendant before the start of the trial.39 The Court ultimately 
 
27 Available at 
https://www.oldbaileyonline.org/static/Punishment.jsp (last 
visited on Oct. 12, 2020) 
28 Old Bailey Online, https://www.oldbaileyonline.org (last visited 
Oct. 6, 2020). 
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refused the request, and the denial was later affirmed by the 
United Stated Supreme Court.40 
Yet, the opinion itself references a March 3, 1821, act 
referring to change of venue.41 The act stated:  
 
 ‘in all suits and actions in any District Court of 
the United States in which it shall appear that the 
judge of such court is in any way concerned in 
interest or has been of counsel for either party, 
or is so related or connected with either party as 
to render it improper for him, in his opinion, to 
sit on the trial of such suit or action, it shall be 
his duty, on application of either party, to cause 
the fact to be entered on the records of the court,’ 
and also an order certifying the case for trial42   
 
While the use of venue was clearly focused on judicial 
recusal rather than location, the ultimate result was the same 
because of a lack of judicial officers. The need for an impartial 
magistrate, and therein a fair trial, clearly necessitated a transfer 
to a new location. 
Article III of the United States Constitution is often 
considered the ultimate authority on venue for purposes of 
criminal cases.43 The text of the document specifically requires 
that an individual be tried for crimes “where said crimes shall 
have been committed.”44 It goes on to indicate that, if the locale 
of the crime cannot be determined, ultimate authority rests with 
Congress to prescribe a location for a trial to occur.45 
To further this goal in civil cases, the Federal 
Government passed Title 28 of the United States Code Section 
1404, which guides changes of venue in civil cases.46 The rule 
grants authority to the presiding judge to transfer jurisdiction 




42 Id. at 660-61. 
43 U.S.CONST. art. III. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2019). 
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have originally been filed in.47 It further permits, by mutual 
consent of the parties, a transfer of location to any venue.48 
Under this section of the U.S. Code, the idea of 
transferring venue should be based upon the need for a matter 
to be resolved justly.49 This can be seen in the case of Emerson 
Electric Company v. Black and Decker Manufacturing Company, 606 
F.2d 234, 241 (8th Cir. 1979).50 The case revolved around a patent 
that had been originally issued to a Mr. Ronald Hickman on 
October 26, 1971.51 Two years later, Mr. Hickman chose to 
assign the patent to a company called Inventec.52  Soon after, 
Inventec granted a license to a second company called Limited, 
who then provided a sublease to Black and Decker.53 The patent 
itself applied to a specific type of workbench originally 
invented by Mr. Hickman.54 The product was trademarked as 
the “Workmate.”55 
In December of 1975, Limited and Inventec filed a 
lawsuit against a manufacturing company located in 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, by the name of Hempe.56 The lawsuit 
arose from an allegation that Hempe was infringing on 
Hickman’s original patent by selling a similar product 
trademarked the “Porta Bench” to Sears.57 The parties were able 
to resolve the matter relatively quickly with a consent 
judgment, which initially seemed to put the matter to rest.58 
However, approximately three years later in July, 1978, Sears 
began to purchase a new type of portable workbench from a 
different company called Emerson.59 This product was called 
the “Work Buddy.”60 
 
47 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2019). 
48 28 U.S.C. § 1404(b) (2019). 
49 Emerson Elec. Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 606 F.2d 234, 241 
(8th Cir. 1979). 
50 Id. 
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Approximately one month into the relationship, 
Inventec sued Sears for patent infringement. The lawsuit was 
brought in Federal District Court in Maryland.61 Venue was 
chosen because Inventec’s main office, legal counsel, and patent 
records were housed in that state.62 Sears was defended by 
Emerson because of a contractual agreement between the two 
companies.63 
In response, Emerson filed its own lawsuit.64 This case 
charged Inventec, Limited, Black and Decker, and Hickman as 
defendants in an action to declare the initial patent for the 
“Workmate” invalid.65 In the alternative, it sought to 
distinguish the “Work Buddy” from the “Workmate” so as to 
find no patent or trademark violation.66 This subsequent case 
was filed in Missouri.67 Similarly to Inventec’s choice to file in 
Maryland, venue was chosen based on Emerson’s ties to the 
state.68 Emerson then moved for a temporary restraining order 
and injunction against proceeding in the Maryland case.69 Black 
and Decker responded by requesting that the Missouri case be 
stayed until the original lawsuit was resolved or, in the 
alternative, transferring the Missouri lawsuit to Maryland.70 
Black and Decker cited United States Code Section 1404 as 
authority for the court to be able to grant the request.71 The 
other defendants in the Missouri case moved to dismiss the case 
entirely for lack of personal jurisdiction.72 
The trial judge granted the motions to dismiss.73 The 
decision was based on the defendants having few if any 
contacts to the state of Missouri.74 The judge further granted 
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conclusion, the court found that Black and Decker had 
“sufficient” motives for suing Sears (Emerson) and that 
“convenience factors” did not support the Missouri lawsuit.76  
Emerson appealed.77 
Affirming the lower court’s decision, the appellate court 
provided guidance on how venue transfers should occur.78 It 
started by expounding on the general federal venue rule.79 This 
rule can be found in Title 28 of the United States Code Section 
1391.80 The code focuses on the defendant’s ties to the location.81 
Section (b) of the states that venue is proper so long as “all 
defendants” are residents of the locale.82 Venue can also rest in 
a place where the actions that necessitated the lawsuit occur.83 
Corporations are found to have residency if their “principal 
place of business” is in a specific district.84  
The Emerson court ultimately sided with Black and 
Decker because, as a defendant, it could have originally been 
sued in Maryland because of its ties to the state.85 In reaching 
its decision, the Eighth Circuit noted that it was not Emerson’s 
ties to the venue that mattered as the plaintiff but Black and 
Decker’s ties as the defendant that were germane. “What counts 
under s 1391 is that the Defendant here, B&D (Black and 
Decker), could have been sued in Maryland.”86 There was no 
other appropriate outcome but to permit the transfer.   
Emerson clearly illustrates one of the most fundamental 
principles as it comes to venue in civil cases. Venue is a 
protection for defendants in lawsuits. This concept directly 
relates back to the concern our forefathers had when forming 
our country; that was that they specifically did not want 
Americans to be tried in a difficult locale which could prevent 




78 Id. at 238. 
79 Id. 





85 Id. at 240. 
86 Id. 
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to inconvenience or hardship.87 If a party was going to sue 
someone, it had to occur in a venue that provided the defendant 
the utmost chance of being able to avail themselves of the 
abilities needed to defend the lawsuit appropriately. 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 provides further 
guidance regarding this idea in criminal cases.88 It reads, 
“[u]nless a statute or these rules permit otherwise, the 
government must prosecute an offense in a district where the 
offense was committed.”89 The rationale for the rule is provided 
within the text of the document itself.90 Specifically, Congress 
requires such a venue restriction for the ease of the defendant, 
victims, or other witnesses in the matter.91 However, if the court 
concludes that a “great” prejudice against the defendant exists, 
a change of venue may occur.92 Under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 21, a judge must grant a transfer if the defendant is 
unable to obtain a fair and impartial jury in the location where 
a case is to be tried.93   
Interestingly, it was not until 1944 that such an 
exception was created.94 According to the committee notes for 
the 1944 amendments to the rule, most lawyers did not know 
that there was no authority to change venue based upon bias in 
the jury composition.95  
 
 ‘Lawyers not thoroughly familiar with Federal 
practice are somewhat astounded to learn that 
they may not move for a change of venue, even 
if they are able to demonstrate that public feeling 
in the vicinity of the crime may render 
impossible a fair and impartial trial. This seems 
 
87 Available at 
https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/colonial-
complaints-u-s-founding-fathers-wanted-activist-government/ (last 
visited on Oct. 12, 2020). 




92 Fed. R. Crim. P. 21(a) (2020). 
93 Id. 
94 See id. 
95 Fed. R. Crim. P. 21 advisory committee’s note (1944).  
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to be a defect in the federal law, which the 
proposed rules would cure.’96 
 
But in 1970, the Supreme Court of the United States 
proclaimed the importance of an unbiased venue in the case of 
Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971).97 In Groppi, the Court 
considered a Wisconsin law that prevented a change of venue 
request made by a defendant in all misdemeanor level cases 
even if an unbiased jury in the case could not be selected.98 
Father Groppi was a Catholic priest who had participated in a 
form of civil disobedience during a protest.99 He was officially 
charged by law enforcement with resisting arrest.100  
Eventually, his case was tried before a jury in Milwaukee 
County, Wisconsin.101  However, this was over the objection of 
the defendant who moved to change venue arguing an 
impartial jury could not be selected.102 In his motion, Father 
Gruppi’s attorney asked the court to take judicial notice of “‘the 
massive coverage by all news media in this community of the 
activities of this defendant.’”103 The trial court denied the 
objection, finding that change of venue requests for 
misdemeanors were strictly forbidden under Wisconsin law.104 
The statute in question was Wisconsin Statute Section 
956.03. Subsection 3 of the statute read:  
 
If a defendant who is charged with a felony files 
his affidavit that an impartial trial cannot be had 
in the county, the court may change the venue of 
the action to (any county where an impartial trial 
can be had). Only one change may be granted 
under this subsection.105   
 
 
96 Homer Cummings, 29 A.B.A. JOUR. 655; Medalie, 4 Lawyers Guild 
R. (3)1, 5. 
97 Groppi v. Wis., 400 U.S. 505, 512 (1971). 







105 WIS. STAT. SECT. 956.03(3) (1967). 
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As the statute specifically applied to defendants 
charged with “felonies,” the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny the request.106 In 
reaching this conclusion, the Wisconsin court discerned that it 
would be rather unusual for a jury pool to have preconceived 
notions about a defendant in a misdemeanor case as the stakes 
were so low for such a crime.107 It also believed that other 
safeguards were in place to get a fair trial, such as continuances 
and strikes to improper jurors.108 
The Supreme Court of the United States disagreed and 
found the statute invalid.109 In making this decision, the Court 
emphasized the importance of a citizen’s right to a fair trial 
provided in the Sixth Amendment and enforced in state 
prosecutions by the Fourteenth Amendment.110 In writing the 
opinion, the justices relied heavily on a case the Court had 
encountered ten years prior.111 There, an Indiana death row 
inmate challenged his conviction and sentence through a 
habeas corpus petition.112 He argued that his second change of 
venue request was improperly denied because the new venue 
was still composed of biased jurors because the publicity 
surrounding the crimes bled into neighboring counties.113 His 
request was denied because the Indiana statute permitted only 
one change of venue request not two.114 However, the United 
States Supreme Court rejected the statute finding that the 
constitutional right to a fair trial trumps the requirement to be 
tried in the location where the crime occurred.115 While it may 
be inconvenient or burdensome to the prosecution and 
witnesses, “the right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally 
accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, ‘indifferent’ jurors. 
The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even the 
minimal standards of due process.”116 
 
106 Groppi, 400 U.S. at 506. 
107 Id. at 507. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 508. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 718 (1961). 
113 Id. at 721. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 722. 
                     8 LMU LAW REVIEW 1 (2020) 242 
Therefore, in Groppi, the Court faced a similar issue.117 
However, instead of a law permitting only one change of venue, 
this law permitted no change of venue in minor cases.118 While 
the Court agreed with the Wisconsin Supreme Court that the 
chances of a jury pool being tainted in a misdemeanor trial were 
questionable, a defendant must nevertheless be given an 
opportunity to show entitlement to change venue no matter the 
unlikelihood of bias existing. 119 To fail to do so would, in 
essence, rob the defendant of his constitutional right to a jury 
trial at all.120   
  Surprisingly, a review of state laws and cases finds an 
acknowledgement of the right to change venue when an 
impartial jury cannot be found existing much earlier than 
federal court.121 Indeed, one of the first references found stems 
from a case arising in 1796 out of the state of Delaware.122 The 
rather short opinion describes a case involving reimbursement 
for a runaway slave between two parties.123 The defendant cited 
two grounds to change the venue of the case from one county 
in Delaware to another.124 The state Supreme Court focused its 
opinion on only one of the grounds raised on appeal, 
specifically centering on an inability to pick an impartial jury.125 
In denying the claim, the court ruled that a defendant’s mere 
belief that an unbiased venire could not be acquired did not rise 
to the level necessary to mandate a change of locale.126 The 
judges wrote, “[t]he defendant's belief is not enough, and 
beyond that there is little or no ground for the motion.”127 
Approximately thirty years later, a case from the state of 
Tennessee provided even greater clarity on the early American 
view of venue in Ex parte Williams.128 There, the plaintiff sought 
the ability to create a road in Smith County, Tennessee.129 The 
 
117 Groppi, 400 U.S. at 509. 
118 Id. at 506. 
119 Id. at 509. 
120 Id. 







128 Ex parte Williams, 12 Tenn. 578, 580 (1833). 
129 Id. at 579. 
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road would be laid through the property belonging to the 
defendant.130 Completely by coincidence, Williams also served 
as a circuit judge for Smith County.131 Therefore, by agreement 
of the parties, venue was changed to neighboring Wilson 
County where Judge Williams ultimately lost his fight to stop 
the road’s construction.132 He then appealed to the appellate 
court.133 
Ruling in favor of Judge Williams, the Supreme Court of 
Errors and Appeals for Tennessee focused on the purpose 
behind the state’s rule for change of venue.134 The court 
referenced state acts that dated back to 1809 which permitted 
change of venue in civil cases.135 In reviewing the laws, the court 
concluded the acts’ purpose was to ensure that a fair jury panel 
could be obtained in the venue where the case would be tried.136 
“The sole object of the whole legislation on the subject was to 
obtain an impartial jury.”137 
In the Williams case, the purpose of the change of venue 
was not to get a fair jury but rather to find a judge who was not 
a party to the case to handle the matter.138 If, for some reason, a 
matter arose where a judge was a party, it fell on him to find 
one of his brethren to try the case.139 The stand-in would come 
to the county of proper venue and hear the matter.140 Therefore, 
the impetus for change of venue statutes, at least in civil 
matters, remained to ensure the parties a fair trial.141 
State laws providing for change of venue in criminal 
matters are supported based on a similar foundation.142 In 1841, 
jurisprudence from the state of New York illustrated this 






134 Id. at 579-80. 
135 Id. at 579. 






142 Dula v. State, 16 Tenn. 511, 511 (1835). 
143 People v. Webb, 1 Hill 179, 182 (N.Y. 1841). 
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of New York charged a defendant with two counts of libel.144 
The charges were originally filed in the county of Ostega.145 
However, due to a high amount of publicity surrounding the 
circumstances of the crime, a motion was made to change venue 
to a neighboring county.146 Interestingly, said motion was made 
by the prosecution not the defendant.147 
Under New York Law at the time, a change was 
permitted if either party could not receive a fair trial because an 
impartial jury was unattainable.148 Therefore, the issue in the 
Webb case was not if the change of venue could happen but 
rather if it could happen when the basis rested solely on an 
affidavit provided by one of the parties and not an actual 
attempt to obtain an impartial venire.149 The prosecutor 
asserted that, “the public mind has become so much prejudiced 
against him (the state) in respect to the prosecutions, that a fair 
and impartial trial cannot be had in Otsego.”150 
In affirming the trial court’s decision to change venue 
and have the case tried in a different county, the Supreme Court 
of New York looked at the sufficiency of the affidavit alleging 
bias rather than the procedure for establishing bias to the 
court.151 Unlike previous decision based on speculation, the 
prosecutor’s affidavit set out numerous undisputed facts that 
provided a basis for a change in location.152 To begin, the 
affidavit specified precise information as to how a local 
newspaper had sought to undermine the credibility of the 
prosecution.153 The prosecution proved that copies of various 
articles were delivered to potential jurors before the trial began 





144 Id. at 181. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 181. 
147 Id. at 182-82. 
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As to the weight of evidence, therefore, on which 
the motion rests, very little comment would 
seem to be necessary.155 The power of the three 
presses has been accidentally or purposely 
combined to work a prejudice in the public mind 
against the complainant, on the very questions 
involved in the prosecutions, and in a manner 
entirely adequate to the proposed effect.156 The 
only options to ensure an impartial jury was to 
grant a change of venue request thereby 
recognizing that the rate of a fair trial is shared 
by all parties to a case. 
 
Thus, a review of the history of venue and motions to 
change venue draws some universal concepts. First, venue is 
tied to the concept of a jury trial. It is clear from hundreds of 
years of jurisprudence as well as our legal roots from English 
Common Law that our Constitutional right to a fair trial is 
meaningless without honoring the need for an unbiased locale. 
Second, the right to an unbiased locale applies to all parties in a 
lawsuit. Despite an initial concern for defendants, plaintiffs in 
civil cases and the government in criminal cases also enjoy 
similar protections. Finally, at the root of a majority of the 
concerns surrounding venue is the fear of polluting the jury 
pool through peripheral information. No matter the format, as 
individuals learn information in different formats, the potential 
ways to contaminate a jury pool increase.   
 
III.  CHANGE OF VENUE GROUNDS 
 
One need not look far to find case law involving change 
of venue requests grounded in coverage by the media. Media 
attention could taint a jury in many ways. For instance, the 
press can provide information about a case not subject to rules 
of evidence or proper court procedure that could influence a 
jury’s verdict making it a result of outside information instead 
of the facts presented in the courtroom. The news also has the 
power to foster sympathy for one side in a lawsuit by 
identifying common ground between would be jurors and a 
party. Jurors who learn of hardships or obstacles faced by one 
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side may see themselves in the plaintiff or defendant if they 
faced similar events in their lives. Lastly, one of the greatest 
potential threats the press poses for our legal system is the 
creation of a group think mentality. With many stations turning 
more to opinion pieces than unbiased reporting, there is an 
equal concern that a juror could decide a high-profile case based 
on what Rachel Maddow or Sean Hannity tells them. 
In Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963), an example of 
a verdict reached by information outside the courtroom can be 
found.157 In the case, the defendant, Wilbert Rideau committed 
a bank robbery in the town of Lake Charles, Louisiana.158 
During the commission of the robbery, he also kidnapped three 
bank tellers ultimately causing the death of one of his 
hostages.159 Soon after the murder, authorities arrested Rideau 
and placed him in the local jail.160 
As part of their investigation into the crime, local law 
enforcement conducted a jail house interview with the 
defendant.161 Investigators both filmed the interview and 
recorded audio.162 Eventually, during the twenty-minute 
interrogation, Rideau confessed to the robbery, kidnapping, 
and murder charges.163 While it is not exactly known how, a few 
hours later a local television station broadcasted the interview 
to the entire town.164 The next day another broadcast of the 
interview launched over the airways.165 Because of high ratings, 
the footage ran yet a third time the next day.166 Altogether, 
estimates believed that just shy of a hundred-thousand people 
saw the report on the news.167 This was for a town of an 
estimated population of one-hundred-and-fifty-thousand 
citizens.168 
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Around two weeks later Mr. Rideau’s attorney moved 
to change venue, citing the news report.169 The trial judge 
denied the motion and ultimately, at trial, the defendant was 
convicted.170 He was sentenced to death for the murder.171 On 
appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court, appellate attorneys 
argued that the request for change of venue should have been 
granted. Still, the appellate court confirmed the conviction.172 
The United States Supreme Court disagreed with the findings 
of the lower court and reversed the conviction, ordering a new 
trial.173 
In reaching a decision, the Justices reviewed portions of 
the recorded video televised to the parishioners of the town.174 
The United States Supreme Court characterized the film: “What 
the people of Calcasieu Parish saw on their television sets was 
Rideau, in jail, flanked by the sheriff and two state troopers, 
admitting in detail the commission of the robbery, kidnapping, 
and murder, in response to leading questions by the sheriff.”175 
The Court questioned whether the defendant even knew he was 
being recorded but conceded, it was not his idea to make the 
production.176 No matter whose idea the film was, the ultimate 
effect was the same.177 Through consistent and continued 
subjection to the program, the jury pool of the town became 
tainted, and the request for a change of venue was required.178 
In failing to grant the motion, the trial judge robbed the 
defendant of due process.179 The Court considered the entire 
trial a “hollow process” infected by a “spectacle” furthered by 
a “kangaroo court.”180 In fact, so great was the taint that the 
justices concluded a review of the voire dire transcript was 
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One of the most infamous cases about publicity and 
change of venue was the trial of Jack Ruby for the murder of 
Lee Harvey Oswald.182 The trial centered on the death of 
President John F. Kennedy and the subsequent murder of his 
alleged assassin.183 Jack Ruby whose real name was Jack 
Rubenstein was tried in Dallas, Texas on March 14, 1964.184 
Ultimately, Ruby was found guilty and sentenced to death. But 
before jury selection, the defense team for Ruby moved for a 
change of venue arguing it was impossible to find an impartial 
jury in Dallas.185 The trial judge denied the motion which was 
brought up on appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals for 
Texas.186 
While the opinion in the case is brief, the concurring 
opinion issued by Judge McDonald merits consideration in a 
discussion on venue.187 McDonald began his concurrence by 
enumerating several potential sources of bias a jury would 
encounter in trying Ruby in Dallas.188 For instance, the trial 
itself occurred in the same courthouse that the alleged crime, 
the murder of Oswald, happened in.189 Furthermore, the 
courthouse in general was around a hundred yards from where 
President Kennedy had been shot.190 McDonald surmised that 
jurors would see the site where Kennedy was murdered “daily” 
while coming in to hear the case. In fact, the location was still 
being visited by mourners while the trial was occurring.191 
Another concern was the guilt that many citizens of 
Dallas felt from the death of the president occurring in their 
city.192 This shame amplified when the alleged murderer, 
Oswald, could no longer be held accountable by a court of law 
as Dallas law enforcement officials failed to keep him safe.193 
This resulted in the belief in some that Dallas was responsible 
 
182 Rubenstein v. State, 407 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966). 
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for one of our most beloved Presidents being denied justice for 
his untimely and brutal assassination.194 As McDonald wrote: 
 
Dallas was being blamed directly and indirectly 
for President Kennedy's assassination and for 
allowing the shooting of Oswald by Ruby. The 
feeling and thought had been generated that 
Dallas County's deprivation of prosecuting 
Oswald could find atonement in the prosecution 
of Ruby. The writer feels it fair to assume that  
the citizenry of Dallas consciously and 
subconsciously felt Dallas was on trial and the 
Dallas image was uppermost in their minds  
to such an extent that Ruby could not be tried 
there fairly while the state, nation and world 
judged Dallas for the tragic November  
events.195 
 
This bias showed in other ways, such as the Dallas local 
media writing editorials and reports about Ruby, describing 
him as a potential mobster involved with organized crime as 
“strip-joint” owner.196 There were even Antisemitic insults 
levied against the defendant necessitating the modification of 
his name from Rubenstein to Ruby.197 Ruby’s attorneys 
bantered about the defense of insanity.198 Yet when brought to 
the local hospital for competency testing to stand trial, 
administrators refused Ruby entrance to their facility.199 
McDonald conceded that finding an impartial jury 
anywhere in the country would be a herculean effort.200 The 
murders of both the president and Oswald had been televised 
multiple time across the airwaves.201 Ultimately, ten members 
of the jury who sat in judgment of Ruby saw the video of 
Oswald’s death.202 But with the entire city of Dallas invested in 
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impartial jury could not be found in that location.203 McDonald 
concluded his concurrence by writing, “Against such a 
background of unusual and extraordinary invasions of the 
expected neutral mental processes of a citizenry from which a 
jury is to be chosen, the Dallas County climate was one of such 
strong feeling that it was not humanly possible to give Ruby a 
fair and impartial trial which is the hallmark of American due 
process of law.”204 
While Ruby serves as a prime example in which an entire 
jury pool can be tainted by a specific act, an even harder case 
arises where the potential jury pool consists of similarly 
situated individuals to a party in the proceeding. In A. C. 
Ferrellgas Corp., Inc. V. Phoenix Insurance Company, 358 P.2d 786 
(Kan. 1961), the Kansas Supreme Court encountered this 
precise situation.205 In the case, a company sued its insurance 
carrier for failing to cover a claim filed due to damage to one of 
its buildings.206 The company alleged that the damage had 
occurred during a storm due to strong winds.207 The insurance 
carrier denied the claim under the guise of arguing the cause of 
the loss was flood waters and not wind.208 As there was an 
exclusion in the policy for damage caused by flood, there was 
no protection under the policy.209 
Before trial, the defense moved to change venue to a 
neighboring county.210 The basis of the request stemmed from 
the argument that the insurer covered several members of the 
community and many had filed claims for losses due to the 
same storm.211 Even if claims had not been made with this 
specific insurance company, the mere fact that potential jurors 
had filed claims biased them from serving as an impartial 
panel.212 By one account, up to thirteen-hundred claims were 
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denied the motion and ultimately the insurance company was 
ordered to cover the loss.214 
 
In affirming the trial court’s decision to deny the request 
to change venue, the Kansas Supreme Court looked to the 
state’s statutory language regarding venue.215 The text 
permitted a switch in location, “when a fair and impartial trial 
cannot be had in the county where a case is pending.”216 The 
only evidence presented by the defendant that the jury was 
biased was its supposition that because so many had suffered 
from the same event sympathy must exist for the plaintiff as a 
form of common ground or universal bond between members 
of the same community.217 The appellate court believed that the 
selection process successfully operated through its inherit 
safeguards and procedures to weed out such concern and arrive 
at a jury who could obtain a verdict based on the evidence 
presented, not on outside commiseration brought into the 
courthouse.218 The court reminded the defendant that decisions 
on venue rest largely in the discretion of the trial judge and 
should be disrupted only if the evidence that a fair jury cannot 
be found is “readily apparent.”219 
Yet an appellate court in New York held the opposite in 
a similar case involving dairy farmers that same year.220 In 
Althiser v. Richmondville Creamery Company, 13 A.D.2d 162, 215 
N.Y.S.2d 122 (1961), the plaintiffs in the lawsuit appealed a 
decision to allow a change of venue from the County of 
Schoharie, New York.221 The plaintiffs were a group of dairy 
farmers who sued the defendant for the difference between the 
amounts they received for milk and other dairy products, 
versus the amounts they would have received from the 
defendant’s competitors.222  
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The lawsuit was comprised of one-hundred-twenty-six 
different dairy farmers.223  The defense’s contention was that 
the pool of potential jurors found in the County of Schoharie 
included friends, family, and other dairy ranchers who could 
sympathize with the plaintiffs.224 Of note was that the trial court 
described Schoharie as a “small rural county.”225 It would 
therefore be impossible for an impartial jury to be found in this 
location.226   
In affirming the lower court transfer of venue, the 
appellate court agreed that because of ties through familial 
bonds, friendship, or simply a common bond from sharing the 
same profession, an impartial jury could not be found.227 The 
decision asides any possible jury venire as:  
 
. . . [P]ersons and the members of their families 
plus a substantial number of other producers 
selling milk to defendants, and ‘in the same 
position’ as plaintiffs, and the members of such 
other producers’ families, constitute a not 
inconsiderable part of the adult population of 
the ‘small rural county’ in which the venue was 
laid and for which the jury list is of but 1,500 
names.228 
 
Yet the appellate court did not stop there.229 It noted that 
even those members of the local community who are not 
similarly situated to the plaintiffs could still pose concerns as 
milk producing was a major economic force in the County of 
Schoharie.230 The lawsuit itself centered on loss of funds that 
would have ultimately been pumped into the community’s 
economy if awarded.231 As a result, a sympathetic jury was 
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the appellate court’s place to overturn the “sound exercise” of 
the trial court’s discretion in granting the request.233 
A final example of cases involving venue changes that 
merit comment are those situations in which damage awards 
could create potential consequences for the individual jurors 
themselves. More specifically, if a lawsuit involves suing a local 
municipality, could potential payouts demand the raising of 
taxes or other fees to compensate the plaintiff which would 
ultimately be passed on to the citizenry of the locale. In Hanson 
v. Garwood Indus., 279 N.W.2d 647 (N.D. 1979), the North 
Dakota Supreme Court addressed the issue in a negligence case 
involving the City of Jamestown, North Dakota.234   
The case arose from an incident involving a six-year-old 
child who was injured when he pulled himself on to the top of 
a garbage dumpster.235 The force of his action caused the 
dumpster to fall on top of him, harming himself.236 The garbage 
container was owned by the City of Jamestown, North Dakota 
and had been fabricated by a company called Garwood 
Industry.237 The child’s mother sued on behalf of her son both 
the city and the company for negligence and strict liability for 
their failure to properly maintain the dumpster.238   
Before trial, the plaintiff moved to change venue.239 An 
affidavit accompanied the pleading in support of the transfer.240 
The only basis for the request was grounded in the argument 
that should the child succeed in his effort to obtain 
compensation for his injuries, the funds to pay said award 
would come from taxpayer money.241 Taxpayers were the 
potential pool of jurors to hear the case.242 Thus, the plaintiff’s 
attorney wrote in the affidavit, “clearly an impartial trial could 
not be conducted by jurors who are taxpayers of Defendant city 
which might well have to respond in money damages to 
Plaintiffs.”243 As a result, the trial court granted the motion and 
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venue was moved from Stutsman County where the City of 
Jamestown was seated to Burleigh County.244 
The City appealed the transfer noting that as the 
defendant’s residence in the case as well as the location of 
where the events took place that were the basis of the claim, 
venue was proper in Stutsman County.245 In North Dakota, the 
law at that time prohibited change of venues unless there was 
“reason to believe” that an impartial jury could not be found in 
that setting.246 Precedent elaborated that a trial court’s decision 
to grant or deny a motion to change venue would be judged by 
an abuse of discretion standard.247 But, the burden to establish 
that a venue would be unfair rested with the moving party.248 
The City’s argument focused on the insufficiency of the 
plaintiff’s affidavit to meet the standard that an impartial jury 
could not be found in Stutsman County.249 The child asserted 
that because the City of Jamestown was in the county and that 
the city was largest municipality in that location, logic dictated 
that most of the jurors would pay city taxes.250 Yet Jamestown 
responded that according to a 1970 census, thirty-five percent 
of the residents lived in unincorporated Stutsman County.251 
With an estimated population of twenty-three-thousand-five-
hundred-and-fifty total residents, there were over eight-
thousand individuals who could serve on the panel.252 
In ruling for the city and reversing the trial court’s 
decision, the appellate court reviewed precedent from other 
jurisdictions.253 The justices looked to the Alaska Supreme 
Court case Maier v. City of Ketchikan, 403 P.2d 34 (Alaska 1965), 
overruled on other grounds, Johnson v. City of Fairbanks, 583 P.2d 
181 (Alaska 1978).254 There too a similar argument was made for 
change of venue that a lower court had accepted.255 The Alaska 
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would create an automatic requirement that whenever a 
municipality was sued its trial could not occur in its home 
county.256 This went directly against the foundation behind 
why venue is situated where it is situated…to protect the 
defendant.257 It also opposed specific guidance provided by the 
United States Supreme Court who wrote, “In cases which touch 
the affairs of many persons, there is reason for holding the trial 
in their view and reach rather than in remote parts of the 
country where they can learn of it by report only.258 There is a 
local interest in having localized controversies decided at 
home.”259 
Yet the North Dakota Supreme Court did not pronounce 
a per se rule that similar arguments could not persevere in the 
future.260 It noted its own decision in Sheridan County v. Davis, 
240 N.W. 867 (1932).261 There, the court found that a change of 
venue was proper because the “entire jury” would consist of 
taxpayers.262 The situation with the City of Jamestown was 
different in that “some” of the potential jurors would be 
taxpayers.263 The two decisions were therefore consistent with 
each other.264 
Indeed, in similar scenarios other courts have concluded 
that a change of venue was proper.265 In Florida for example, 
the Florida Supreme Court upheld a transfer of venue decision 
by a trial judge when a bank requested a change of venue in a 
case involving obtaining financial damages as a payee on a local 
school board’s note.266 The court held that as taxpayers, the 
potential jurors had an adverse interest to the plaintiff’s 
success.267 In Berry v. N. Pine Elec. Company, Incorporated, 50 
N.W. 2d 117 (Minn. 1951), the Minnesota Supreme Court found 
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venue changed.268 Here, the plaintiff was a child injured by an 
electric pole falling on him.269 Most of the residents of the 
county where venue was proper were stockholders in the 
electric company and therefore would be impacted should a 
verdict in favor the child be issued.270 And in the State of 
Washington, their Supreme Court held that a lawsuit for 
attorney fees against a utility company required venue to be 
changed.271 Potential jurors could presume, depending on the 
amount of the award, rates would increase to cover the costs.272 
This resulted in the would-be venire panel having a contrary 
interest to the plaintiff’s success.273 
 
IV.  SIMILARITIES TO COVID-19 CASES 
 
In the beginning of this document, the fact that the 
coronavirus has not only infected millions of U.S. citizens, but 
every aspect of our society became a springboard to a 
discussion on change of venue. But the reality of this statement 
cannot be overlooked. The author of this article is hard-pressed 
to find a single aspect of society that has not potentially forever 
been changed by the disease. As lawsuits begin to work their 
way through our legal system, will there be a single juror who 
has not seen media coverage about the pandemic? Will 
attorneys and courts be able to empanel an impartial group who 
can sit in judgment of a case that relates in part back to COVID-
19?   
One study launched in May 2020 found a direct 
connection between the amount of media consumed by the 
public on the topic of the coronavirus and how affected the 
home country of those consumers was.274 More specifically, the 
worse hit by the virus the more media watched.275 In August, 
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the United States became the world leader in virus death 
surpassing all other countries.276 As a result, Americans have 
become some of the largest consumers of media on the subject 
and with it, some of the least impartial individuals on the 
planet. 
Setting aside media coverage for a moment, case law 
shows that a second way venue may be tainted is if a large 
proportion of potential jurors from that locale are affected by a 
specific incident and that incident somehow plays a role in the 
case. Here too, COVID-19 has wreaked havoc on venires 
throughout American jurisdictions.277 At first it appeared that 
urban areas such as New York and Los Angles would be the 
hardest hit areas from the virus.278 Yet over the summer, that 
quickly changed.279 Late July and early August saw some of the 
highest increases in infection rates and deaths in states like 
Missouri, Minnesota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Wyoming, and 
Nebraska.280 This trend even prompted a direct warning from 
Dr. Deborah Brix, a lead on President Trump’s COVID-19 
Taskforce to state on live television, “[t]o everybody who lives 
in a rural area, you are not immune or protected from this 
virus.”281 
No location has been spared from the virus’ effects. 
People everywhere have lost jobs, wages, and loved ones from 
the disease. Once lawsuits begin making their way through our 
legal system, transferring venue from a hard-hit area to a less 
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hard-hit area may be impossible. Finding an impartial venue 
may become a herculean task if there if there is no locale not 
impacted by the disease. 
Ultimately, who will bear financially responsibility for 
all the losses associated from COVID-19 could also make the 
prospect of finding a fair venue impossible. When lockdowns 
began, local and state governments led the charge to shutter 
businesses to protect public health.282 Those business owners 
began fighting back demanding the right to reopen.283 Although 
the United States Supreme Court seems to have issued some 
case law supporting the states’ right to close such business, 
what happens in the future remains to be seen.284 And of course, 
just because the Supreme Court may provide some protection 
to governments does not mean that concept will protect them 
from large jury verdicts by angry citizens in the future. 
The possibility of state coffers paying out large awards 
is a double-edged sword in the sense that it cuts both ways. The 
jury pool could be tainted because, as has been seen in prior 
cases, a concern may exist that taxes will be raised to pay these 
amounts. That said, on the flip side, jurors angry at their 
political leaders for closing business downs because of COVID-
19 could purposely side with the business owner as payback. In 
essence, the potential taint from this concern increases 
exponentially.  
 
V.  SOLUTIONS 
 
As time progresses in the spread of the illness, the 
potential reality exists that there may be no “hot spot” free 
venues available to try cases in. If this occurs, then judges and 
lawyers need to consider alternative solutions in finding 
unbiased venues to try cases. One potential idea is to utilize the 
voir dire process to ask more probing questions as to the 
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specific effect of COVID-19 on a potential juror. If enough of a 
difference exists between their experience with the disease and 
the case’s tie to the illness, the likelihood exists that the person 
still may be able to hear the case. For example, if a juror lost 
their job because of COVID-19 closures, he or she still may be 
able to hear a wrongful death case arising out of negligent care 
for sickness in a nursing home. Potentially, anger over losing a 
job to the disease does not bias someone similarly to losing a 
loved one. Yet the importance of probing questions on the part 
of the trial attorneys during the jury selection process cannot be 
overstated for this idea to succeed.   
A second proposal to combat the venue issue could be 
reliance on more bench trials where the judge sits as the fact 
finder together with their role as law interpreter. If the concern 
is that potential jurors could not set aside their biases, then the 
hope would be that a single judge could. Understandably, 
judges too have been affected by COVID-19. This suggestion is 
not to imply that this group has somehow been spared from the 
ravages of the disease. Rather, the proposal acknowledges that 
judges are trained and duty bound to remain neutral in a case.  
Capitalizing on these qualities may better serve parties for the 
time being than be tried by a jury of one’s peers. 
A third idea could be the development of a specific jury 
instruction to address COVID-19 bias. Special jury instructions 
are used throughout the litigation process. Criminal lawyers 
often see this occur in death penalty cases to help seat a death 
qualified jury.285 For that reason, writing guidance for jurors to 
recognize potential bias on the topic is not an extraordinary 
remedy. The key would be involving lawyers, judges, and those 
impacted by the illness during the drafting process to ensure an 
adequate remedy. 
One final thought would be the potential of wiping the 
COVID-19 taint from the case altogether to see if it is relevant 
and necessary to the determination of a verdict. Imagine an 
argument centered on the idea that the role the illness plays in 
a matter is too prejudicial outweighing its probative value. Like 
the evidentiary objection found in most venues, a judge could 
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erase, if not limit, the mentioning of COVID-19 during the case 
in chief thereby erasing if not limiting its effect.286 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
Ultimately, it remains unclear what life after the 
pandemic will look like. With courthouses across the country 
shuttered, the number of lawsuits waiting to be filed is akin to 
a ticking time bomb about to explode. Whether those cases are 
heard by a fair and impartial jury from a specific location, at the 
moment, seems uncertain. But moving forward it falls to judges 
and attorneys to approach the voir dire process in a different 
way to root out bias. Inquiries about life during the pandemic 
may soon become standard questioning procedure for many 
lawyers litigating cases post COVID-19. One thing is certain, 
ignoring the subject altogether equates to a failure to provide 
adequate legal representation, inviting a reversal on appeal. 
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